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Abstract
Throughout history the world has been plagued by insurgencies. While
the underlying causes of each new insurgency have been different, they
are all similar in certain areas. This similarity entails that the effective
countering of an insurgency can be turned into a science with a set of
guidelines to follow based on conditions on the ground. Guidelines are
important because insurgencies are flexible and to defeat them the
counterinsurgency must be equally flexible if not more flexible. Good
intelligence is critical to the success of an insurgency. With their small,
poorly equipped forces, the leaders of insurgencies need to know when
to strike and when to pull back. This reliance on intelligence means that
an effective counterinsurgency must also rely on good intelligence so
that the counterinsurgents may know where the insurgency will strike,
where they are based, how they are supplied, where they keep their
weapons, and other essential pieces of information.
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Throughout history the world has been plagued by insurgencies. While
the underlying causes of each new insurgency have been different, they
are all similar in certain areas. This similarity entails that the e ffective
countering of an insurgency can be turned into a science with a set of
guidelines to follow based on conditions on the ground. Guidelines are
important because insurgencies are flexible and to defeat them the
counterinsurgency must be equally flexible if not more flexible. Good
intelligence is critical to the success of an insurgency. With their small,
poorly equipped forces, the leaders of insurgencies need to know when
to strike and when to pull back. This reliance on intelligence means that
an effective counterinsurgency must also rely on good intelligence so that
the counterinsurgents may know where the insurgency will strike, where
they are based, how they are supplied, where they keep their weapons,
and other essential pieces of information.
The United States has run effective insurgencies against the British in
the American Colonies during the Revolutionary War, the Japanese in
the Philippines during World War II, and provided critical aid to the
Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets during the Soviet–Afghan War.
With these prior triumphs the United States should be better prepared to
counter insurgencies. However, having failed in Vietnam, Somalia, and
Lebanon, their successes on the side of the insurgent have not t ranslated
into success on the other side. The verdict is still out on the current
counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq but victory can be achieved
in both situations.
In order to discover what actions need to be taken to wage an effective
counterinsurgency and why intelligence is critical to the process, it is
important to look at the past successes and failures of both insurgencies
and counterinsurgencies. It is also important to note what has changed
in modern insurgencies and what has stayed the same in order to
ensure that effective strategies from the past will still be effective today.
Lessons learned from the American Revolution, Boer Wars, Filipino
Insurgency during World War II, Vietnam War, Soviet–Afghan War, and
the Lebanese Civil War can help us understand the challenges facing us
today in Iraq and Afghanistan. From these case studies, a broader picture
can be drawn regarding the intelligence successes and failures of each
war. From here, a better plan can be developed that will be effective in
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e liminating the problems of the past and thus support for the insurgency
can be reduced until it is no longer a viable force.

The American Revolution: 1775–1783
The success of the American Revolution is due, in large part, to the
successful intelligence operations conducted by George Washington.
During the French and Indian Wars, Washington had learned that
“There is nothing more necessary than good intelligence to frustrate
a designing enemy, & nothing that required greater pains to obtain.”1
In December 1776, the future of the revolution was looking grim.
Washington’s army had been continually pummeled by British r egulars
and Hessian mercenaries at Long Island, White Plains, and Fort
Washington. The Colonial Army had managed to retreat across New
Jersey and cross the Delaware River and the British decided to wait until
warmer weather to put an end to the rebellion. Both sides thought the
end was near until a man named John Honeyman was seized near the
camp and brought before Washington as a suspected spy. Honeyman had
fought beside Washington during the French and Indian Wars and was
currently one of Washington’s spies. Honeyman told Washington that the
British and Hessians were off guard and distracted because Christmas
was approaching. Washington locked him in the guardhouse overnight
to preserve his cover and then engineered his escape the same night
by causing a fire. Honeyman reported back to the British commander,
Colonel Rall, about his escape and that the Americans were completely
incapable of mounting an offensive. This confirmed Rall’s own thoughts
so he ignored the talk from his other agents saying that the Americans
were about to attack. The Americans attacked during a blizzard and
took Trenton. Only four of their men were wounded.2 The American
Revolution was saved due to the effective use of intelligence.
During his stay at Valley Forge the following winter Washington wrote
letters mentioning fictitious infantry and cavalry regiments which he
passed on to his double agents. The letters made it to the British and
caused them to believe that Washington had over eight thousand more
troops than he actually had. They concluded that he was too strong to
attack at that time.3 Just as it had the previous winter, intelligence once
again saved the American Revolution.
In the summer of 1780 the French landed at Newport, Rhode Island.
The Culper Spy Ring warned Washington that Clinton, whose army was
in New York, planned to attack the French. Washington slipped reports
to British spies claiming that he was planning an offensive against
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New York. Clinton called off the attack on the French forces after
learning of Washington’s plans.4 Instead of conducting an attack against
an unprepared French force, Clinton’s army sat in New York and waited
for Washington’s attack which never came. Had Clinton attacked the
French at Newport it is likely that he would have been victorious.
In the summer of 1781, Clinton received American dispatches about a
combined attack from Washington’s army and the French forces against
New York. This had in fact been the original plan but W
 ashington
changed his mind and decided to head south and attack Cornwallis
instead. To trick Clinton he prepared letters stating that his original
plan still stood and both his forces and the French forces would be
attacking New York. He also set up a camp at Chatham, New Jersey
and set boats on the shore leading the British to suspect an invasion
of Staten Island.5 As the French and American forces moved south,
Clinton’s army stayed in New York and prepared for an attack that
would never come.
George Washington’s use of intelligence during the American Revolution
paved the way for the American victory. When they used intelligence
the Americans were able to fight when they knew they could win and
convince the British not to attack when they knew they would lose.
When the future of the revolution looked bleakest it was the use of good
intelligence that brought them through it. Had Colonel Rall listened
to his other intelligence reports and prepared his defenses, then the
American Revolution may have been crushed at Trenton in 1776. Had
the British sent scouts to Valley Forge and discovered the true strength
and condition of Washington’s forces, the revolution may have ended
there in 1777. Had Clinton verified the reports sent to him concerning
Washington’s impending attack in the summer of 1780 he may have
discovered it to be a ruse and defeated the French forces in Newport.
Had Clinton learned from that previous deception and monitored the
movement of Washington’s forces and the French forces in the summer
of 1781 then he may have been able to provide support to Cornwallis in
Yorktown.
The insurgency and counterinsurgency of the American Revolution
was significantly different than those of today. The encounters b
 etween
the two forces were still set-piece battles. Despite that difference, this
case study still shows that the effective use of intelligence by one
side led to significant advantages. The clarity of the advantages
that intelligence p
 roduced in the American Revolution provides the
groundwork from which effective strategies to defeat insurgencies and
the use of intelligence in those strategies can be built.
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The Boer Wars: 1880–1881 and 1899–1902
The Boer Wars offer an interesting case when looking at the use of
intelligence in effective counterinsurgency strategies because the two
wars are close together chronologically and the wars had a different
outcome. The British were resoundingly defeated during the First Boer
War while the Boers were defeated despite high British casualties during
the Second Boer War. These results allow a look at the different tactics
used that allowed the British to succeed during the Second Boer War
and caused them to fail during the first.
The First Boer War was a few months long and saw three major battles.
The first battle at Laing’s Nek was an attempted incursion into the Boer’s
territory in Transvaal. The British, led by General Colley were crushed
at Laing’s Nek and retreated to Schuinshoogte hill. The Boer’s attacked
the hill causing the British to once again retreat. The British forces used
easily recognizable fighting formations, bright red uniforms, and shiny
white helmets. All of which led to their downfall.6 The Boers were better
marksmen and hid in whatever cover they could find. General Colley
ascended Mount Majuba with most of his troops, approximately 375
riflemen. This is where the final battle was to take place. Historians are
still unsure as to why Colley chose to take this mountain but the most
accepted idea is that he wanted to make a show of force from what he saw
as an unassailable position. The Boers attacked with no more than 350
men. They attacked early in the morning and performed what has been
called a perfect example of fire and movement which is still being taught
to this day. They used the brush and terraces as cover and advanced
behind a knoll. After a lull in the firing, the Boers flanked the British and
hid beyond the crest of the hill. This position allowed them to shoot the
British in the backs at close range. The British began to retreat and many
were shot as they fled. Some tried to hide but were rounded up by the
Boers. Only one Boer was killed. This crushing defeat for the British ended
the First Boer War and pushed the British to negotiate a peace settlement.7
Colley made several mistakes both before and during the battle. He was
overconfident in the abilities of his troops and in the terrain which he
chose to fight on. His belief that the position was unassailable may have
been swayed had he conducted proper reconnaissance of all sides of the
mountain. The knoll that the Boers were able to enter behind was a clear
weak point and he should have had more troops stationed there. This lack
of GEOINT enabled the Boers to exploit the terrain to their advantage.
Colley also should have conducted watches and patrols around the clock
so as not to be surprised by a Boer attack. Tactical intelligence on the
movements of the Boers, especially just prior to the attack, would have
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allowed Colley to prepare his men accordingly and set up defensive
formations in positions that would have given them a wide view of the
slope that the Boers were advancing on. This failure is reminiscent of the
German Hessians at Trenton during the American Revolution where lack
of intelligence also led to a crushing defeat in a decisive battle.
The Second Boer War was longer and the British learned from some of
the mistakes they had made during the First Boer War but were slow to
catch on to other mistakes. One important change that was instituted
early was that they painted their red uniforms khaki. This adoption of a
more camouflaged appearance made the field a little less unbalanced.8
The Boers had a high level of individual training and could be likened
to an army of snipers. They had a high level of confidence in their
own abilities and had a great degree of initiative. They did not use any
particular maneuvers and instead relied on a sort of swarm technique in
which they would surround the enemy and each individual Boer would
close in whenever they saw the opportunity to do so. When defending an
area from advancing British troops, the Boers would use the terrain to
their full advantage. They would build trenches at the bases of small hills
and camouflage them with leaves and branches. This allowed them to fire
while standing and still be concealed. It also confused the British who
would fire their artillery at the tops of the hills as they expected the Boers
to occupy the higher ground. The Boers also developed what is known as
a strongpoint defense. They created a series of partially roofed z igzagging
slit trenches at the bases of hills. They lured the British advance in
between their trenches and then opened fire on them from the front and
from either side. Sometimes the Boers would create dummy trenches at
the tops of hills, where the British would expect them to be, so that the
British would fire their artillery at the dummy trenches. The Boers also
used scouts to track the movement of the British forces so they were able
to easily evade the British who always traveled in large groups.9
Despite the effective use of both GEOINT and HUMINT by the Boers,
they were unable to effectively assault the British garrisons due to their
lack of artillery. General Kitchener, who was in command of the British
forces from 1900 to the end of the war in 1902, employed three s trategies
that proved to be decisive in the defeat of the Boers. These were scorched
earth, civilian internment camps, and blockhouse chains.10 The scorched
earth policy involved burning farms and slaughtering cattle. The Boers
were unable to protect the farms from being destroyed and this led to
large food shortages in the Boer population. The civilians from these
farms were then put into camps that became overcrowded very quickly.
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Over one-third of the civilians who entered the camps died from either
disease or malnourishment.11 The blockhouse chains were critical in
hampering the movements of the Boers. A blockhouse is an isolated
one-building fort used against enemies who do not possess artillery.
By building a chain of these forts the British were able to see across vast
distances and protect large areas from Boer attack. Even with these
effective strategies, the British required a force of 4,50,000 soldiers to
stop the Boers whose force was never more than 50,000.12

Filipino Insurgency during World War II: 1942–1945
Following the defeat of the main U.S. forces at Bataan on April 9, 1942
some of the U.S. soldiers who had been separated from the main force
were left with the decision to either surrender or try to escape the islands.
A few of them chose another route and decided to stay and develop a
Filipino insurgency movement against the Japanese occupiers. One of
the commanders, who was also one of the only commanders on Luzon
who had not been captured or killed by 1943 was Lieutenant Ramsey.13
He traveled all across the Philippines, mostly on the island of Luzon, to
recruit Filipinos into the insurgency. They did not usually fight against
the Japanese patrols and usually just kept tabs on where the Japanese
were, how many there were, what defenses they were building, and how
many ships they had. Cells were developed in towns and villages and in
the capital, Manila, that reported, through the use of runners who hand
delivered messages to Ramsey’s headquarters, a highly camouflaged
camp on the top of a mountain.
To combat these cells the Japanese would conduct raids on villages they
suspected of housing insurgents and on outposts whenever they found
them. Sometimes the villages and outposts were given advanced warning
through the use of scouts and sometimes they were not. The Japanese
would also do sweeps of the city of Manila when they heard that Ramsey
was there. They never caught him.
In 1944, they stepped up their offensive operations with a plan to place
small bombs on varying timers all over the city of Manila. They created
small lead bombs filled with black powder. The timing mechanism was
sulfuric acid which would slowly eat through a copper plate and light
matches which would ignite the black powder. The copper plates were of
varying thickness depending on what time of day they were supposed to
be placed so that the bombs would go off at roughly the same time. They
trained saboteurs to place the bombs near fuel or ammunition where
they would cause secondary explosions.14 The saboteurs went about
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their normal business in Manila carrying the small bombs with them.
When they got to a target they would place their bomb and activate it.
The bombs were supposed to go off around midnight that night but as
Ramsey and the others waited and watched the city the bombs did not go
off. Two hours later, they were about to lose hope when explosions ripped
through the city. The Japanese’s main fuel depot was exploding and
then the tanker cars at the rail station exploded. Oil lubricant tanks also
exploded and the explosions continued throughout the night. Near dawn
there was a massive explosion on the bay. One bomb had been placed
into a 50 gallon oil drum and that drum had been loaded onto a 10,000
ton Japanese tanker. The entire Japanese tanker exploded causing a
nearby tanker and cruiser to go up in flames.15 In response to this attack
the Japanese constructed roadblocks all across Manila, confiscated food
from the citizens, many of whom had already been starving, and d
 oubled
their patrols. None of these efforts were effective because nobody
betrayed the location of Ramsey’s base.16
Ramsey sent messages to General MacArthur every day via radio
describing what the Japanese were doing. As MacArthur’s invasion of
the Philippines drew near, the messages sent out from Ramsey’s base
increased significantly. Reports poured in from Ramsey’s scouts which
detailed the Japanese defenses.17 When MacArthur’s invasion force
landed at Leyte Gulf on October 20, 1944, Ramsey’s guerillas worked
even harder. They ambushed Japanese patrols and convoys. One ambush
was especially fruitful when they found the new plans for the Japanese
defense of the island on one of the officers they had killed. The details of
the plan were radioed to General MacArthur.18 When the American forces
pushed forward, the Japanese became trapped between the Americans
and the Filipino guerillas. The intelligence and support provided by the
guerillas saved many American lives and shortened the amount of time
it took to retake the Philippines.
This case study provides a few lessons in combating insurgents. None of
the efforts by the Japanese were effective in combating the i nsurgency.
The roadblocks did not restrict their movement since they could
easily evade them. The patrols were also ineffective in restricting the
insurgent’s movement or catching large numbers of them because of
their use of scouts to track the Japanese patrols. The patrols were also
easy targets for ambush by insurgents. The cutting off of food supplies
to civilians did not weaken the civilian support for the insurgency and
nobody betrayed the location of Ramsey’s base to the Japanese. The
brutal treatment of prisoners was also ineffective in gaining any useful
information about the insurgents. The insurgency continued to grow
despite the efforts of the Japanese.
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It is also important to note how the insurgents could inflict significant
damage on the Japanese with small and simple explosives. What was
essentially a pipe bomb was able to sink two Japanese tankers and
cripple one cruiser simply because it was placed in a good location. The
rest of the pipe bombs destroyed significant amounts of Japanese oil
which could not be easily replaced.

Soviet–Afghan War and Aftermath: 1979–September
2001
In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in order to prop
up the floundering Afghan communist regime. In response, the United
States significantly increased their funding of the anti-communist Afghan
Mujahideen. Much of this funding went through the Pakistani ISI who
distributed it to their favored commanders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.19
The CIA also dealt directly with other effective commanders who were
being undermined by the ISI such as Ahmed Shah M
 assoud.20 However,
this direct aid was not enough to influence post-Soviet Afghanistan.
In 1986, the United States began shipping Stinger missiles to the
Mujahideen. These missiles were so effective against the Soviets that
they were no longer able to carry out low-flying attack raids or e vacuate
their wounded by helicopter. This turned the tide of the war against the
Soviets.21 Gorbachev began wondering what the Soviets were doing
there and planned to withdraw within a year or two. The Soviets were
completely surprised by the presence of this advanced weapon on the
battlefield. Without any warning, the Soviets were unable to prepare
any defenses against it. In 1989, the Soviets left Afghanistan leaving the
communist Najibullah government to fend for itself.
In 1992, Massoud’s forces captured Kabul. When they occupied the city,
there were no retributions and their primary goal, according to Massoud,
was to protect the Afghan people in the city. An interim government was
formed with Burrudin Rabbani being declared the president and Massoud being named the minister of defense.22 However, Pakistan did not
favor this government and supported Hekmatyar in his fight against the
interim government. By mid-1992, the two sides began fighting on the
streets of Kabul.23 In 1994, Hekmatyar was defeated and the Pakistanis
shifted their support to the Taliban, a new group formed in the madrassas
of the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier.24
The Taliban moved out of Pakistan and into Afghanistan in 1994. They
wielded brand new weapons and promised to bring an end to the violence
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plaguing Afghanistan. Many Afghans initially w
 elcomed the Taliban
because they believed their pledge to stop the violence. The Taliban
were able to buy many of their victories and many Afghans joined their
side. When they got to Kabul in 1996, the interim government withdrew
because they did not wish for the city to be damaged any further. They
withdrew to Bagram Air Base to the north of Kabul.25 They held the line
here until U.S. military aid and bombing allowed the Northern Alliance
to drive the Taliban out of Kabul in November 200126 even though
President Bush did not want the Northern Alliance to be the ones to take
the city.27
This case study provides some important lessons in the type of strategic
intelligence that should be collected in order to ensure that the s ituation
does not destabilize in the long term. During the Soviet–Afghan War
the United States was supporting the insurgency, but this lesson can be
applied when combating an insurgency as well. The United States either
failed to consider or failed to fully realize Pakistan’s intentions in regards
to Afghanistan. Pakistan wanted Afghanistan to be a f undamentalist
Islamic state that they could influence. They also wanted more r adical
fighters to use in their fight over Kashmir. The United States should
have collected more intelligence on Pakistan’s intentions instead of
allowing them to dictate who the funding and weapons went to for most
of the war. When fighting an insurgency, it is important to m
 onitor the
neighboring countries very closely because support in the form of
weapons, supplies, or more volunteers could flow from neighboring
countries and insurgents could hide in neighboring countries.
The United States also failed to pay attention to those who saw the need
to aid the Afghan interim government following the fall of Najibullah’s
government. The intelligence was there and the radicals clearly had an
advantage, having received most of the aid that the United States and
Saudi Arabia had funneled through Pakistan, but the warnings that
these radicals would be a threat were ignored. When fighting against an
insurgency, the decision to pull out of that fight should be taken with
great care and that decision should rely on intelligence reports.
Intelligence should be collected on the country where the insurgency
is taking place and on the insurgent group or groups. The reports
should include how much support the government has and how much
support the insurgency has, the military and police capabilities of the
government, the ease with which the insurgency can inflict damage, and
an analysis of whether or not the government will be able to withstand
the insurgency. If the report finds that the insurgency will be able to
overpower the government, then the supporting country should continue
its support of the government against the insurgency.
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U.S. Involvement in Lebanese Civil War: 1982–1984
The U.S. Marines came to Lebanon as peacekeepers in August 1982.
They went there to facilitate the withdrawal of the PLO forces from
Lebanon but America did not understand the deep history of Lebanon or
the roots of their conflict which was full of passion on every side. During
the first few months the Marines were there, the fighting did die down
but soon the Lebanese grew tired of the lectures from the Americans
and returned to their fighting.28 The Marines had originally only been
scheduled to be there for one month but they withdrew two weeks earlier
than the deadline because all of the PLO fighters had departed and they
did not want an open-ended mission. After they left, Israel invaded
West Beirut and the massacres of the Palestinians at Sabra and Shatila
occurred. So, the Americans returned out of guilt.29
The American’s thought that Lebanon already had the right political
institutions and that those institutions were merely too weak in their
current state so they decided to try and rebuild the central government
and the army.30 Unfortunately they were unaware of Lebanese President,
Amin Gemayel’s intentions. He used the Americans against his Muslim
enemies. By training the Lebanese national army, the Americans came
to be seen by the Muslims as being on Gemayel’s side of the conflict
rather than as being peacekeepers. It started with rocks being thrown at
Marines who were on foot patrols, then a grenade injured five Marines,
and then the U.S. embassy was struck by a suicide car bomber on April
18, 1983. Finally, on the morning of September 19, the Americans
ceased to be peacekeepers and became just another faction in the civil
war. The commander of the Lebanese Army, General Tannous claimed
that Syrian- and Palestinian-backed Druze units were launching a
major offensive against his army at Souk el-Gharb and they would not
be able to hold out. If Souk el-Gharb was taken, the Druze would be able
to fire down onto the presidential palace. Without seeking c onfirmation
of General Tannous’ report, the guided missile cruisers Virginia, John
Rodgers, and Bowen and the destroyer Radford fired 360 5-inch shells at
the Syrian, Palestinian, and Druze attackers. The next day the Americans
discovered that only eight Lebanese army soldiers had been killed the day
before. On the morning of October 23, 1983 the Marines’ h
 eadquarters
was struck by a suicide car bomber and 241 American s ervicemen were
killed. On February 26, 1984 the Marines finished p
 ulling out of
Lebanon. Their 18 month stay in Lebanon had a
 ccomplished n
 othing
because the policy makers did not have the proper intelligence to
sunderstand the conflict they were sending the Marines into.
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Assessment of Intelligence Operations and Tactics
Effective

Ineffective/Not Done

American
Revolution

Give British
false intelligence
concerning troops 
movements and
troop strength

British didn’t seek
to corroborate their
intelligence through
multiple sources

First Boer
War

Boers exploit terrain
to their advantage

British did not
scout terrain—
assumed it was
and unassailable 
position

Second Boer
War

Boers built
fake defenses
where the British
thought their
defenses would be
and hidden defenses
in other places
British removed
Boers base of
support by burning
crops and putting
civilians in camps
British watched
Boer movements
with blockhouse
chains

Filipino
Insurgency

Intelligence gathered
by Filipinos using
cell structure

Japanese patrols
Japanese raids
Japanese torture
Japanese roadblocks

Filipinos used runners
for communications.
Only one radio at the
camp which was used
to communicate
with MacArthur.
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Effective

Ineffective/Not Done

Filipino scouts tracked
Japanese patrols
Japanese eventually
did triangulate on
radio position
Soviet–Afghan War
and a
 ftermath

Stinger missiles
devastated Soviet
aircraft

Soviets failed
to foresee 
introduction
of advanced 
American weapons
like the Stinger

Taliban propaganda

Americans failed to see
the strengthening
of the radical
Islamists
Americans did not
look into Pakistan’s
intentions concerning
Afghanistan

Lebanese Civil War

Americans failed
to realize Israel’s
intentions
Americans failed to
understand the 
culture and history
of the conflict
Americans failed
to see how the
government was
not representative
of the citizens and
was merely another
faction
Americans used
overwhelming naval
firepower without
checking their own
intelligence
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Lessons Learned
In each conflict there were effective and ineffective intelligence
operations and tactics performed. In some cases only one side did
anything effective. In other cases both sides were effective in different
ways. The following charts categorize each operation as being either
effective or ineffective/not done.
There are two effective non-intelligence operations that should be
highlighted as well. These are the pipe bombs used during the Filipino
Insurgency and the suicide car bombs used during the Lebanese Civil
War. Once the pipe bombs were planted, there was little that the
Japanese would have been able to do even if they had learned of the
operation. The targets were chosen by each individual and although a
few individuals were caught, the bombs still inflicted a massive
amount of damage. The one that did the most damage was dropped
into a barrel of oil so it was impossible to see after it was planted.
During the suicide truck bombings in Lebanon, the only warning
was the truck speeding toward each building. These operations are
similar to the planting of improvised explosive devices by insurgents in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Once an IED is planted it is difficult to detect and
while some can be jammed, insurgents will just revert back to lower-tech
detonators that cannot be jammed such as hardwired detonators.
The safer and more effective way to counter the threat of IEDs is to
learn of the operations beforehand and learn where they are b
 eing
kept. Each bomb has a bomb maker. Lieutenant Ramsey and the
Filipinos relied upon one man, the technical director of the Manila Gas
Company, to make the pipe bombs. Modern insurgents rely on many
bomb makers and also ship in bombs from neighboring c ountries.
Discovering intelligence on both of these types of operations and
stopping them is critical.
False intelligence can be used by insurgents to turn people against the
counter-insurgents and prevent their supply lines from being disrupted,
their weapons caches from being discovered, or their cells from being
discovered. A counterinsurgent force should not fall into the same trap
that the British did during the American Revolution. That is why the first
lesson is to gather intelligence from multiple sources.
During the Boer Wars the terrain was hilly and the Boers were able to use
this to their advantage on many occasions. In Iraq, much of the combat
occurs in cities. The insurgents know this terrain well. They have lived
there and can blend into the civilian population. Where the Boers used
trees and bushes for cover, the insurgents in Iraq use the fact that they
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are inconspicuous. It is important for a counterinsurgent force to know
the terrain and each part of the terrain that can be exploited. In these
urban environments the civilians are in a way part of the terrain. Troops
assigned to an area should get to know as many of the civilians there as
they can. Getting to know the people provides counterinsurgents with
multiple benefits. The troops can build trust and understanding with the
people, the people may provide them with actionable intelligence, it
lessens the pool of possible recruits for insurgents, and it removes those
people as cover for the insurgents.
The British built chains of blockhouses so that they could contain the
Boers. This was effective because the Boers had previously been able to
slip by the large British garrisons and strike wherever they wanted. The
blockhouse could be adapted to work in the mountains and fields
of Afghanistan as well as the cities of Iraq. By creating a series of
armored, unmanned observation posts along the border with Pakistan
where the insurgents infiltrate, U.S. forces would gain real time
intelligence on their movements. With this intelligence, U.S. forces
could either move in to intercept them or call in air strikes on their
positions. In an urban environment, the idea could be adapted by creating
a series of small outposts throughout the city rather than concentrating
forces in the large bases. Small scattered outposts would allow soldiers
to protect larger areas of the cities from insurgent attacks and respond
quicker when insurgents do attack. These bases would be close enough
together that they could support each other if they came under attack.
The British also denied Boer civilians of their food supplies and placed
them into camps. These were effective tactics against the Boers but
they would not be effective against the modern insurgent. The case of
the Filipino insurgency illustrated why. The Japanese had used s imilar
techniques against the Filipinos and none of them were e ffective.
Instead, Filipino resolve only strengthened in each instance. The
modern insurgent is more like the Filipino than they are like the Boer.
Tactics like torture, rounding up civilians suspected of being i nsurgents,
and cutting off food supplies would only strengthen the resolve of the
modern insurgent and provide more reasons for more people to join
the insurgents. Insurgents use propaganda to recruit people and each
of these tactics feed the insurgent’s propaganda machine. The Taliban
used propaganda during their rise to power and many Afghans got
behind them because they wanted an end to the fighting. The Taliban’s
propaganda is all lies but they are still able to attract people to their
cause with it. The counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are
noble m
 issions. U.S. soldiers are there to protect the popularly elected
government and their citizens. The insurgents lure people in with
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lies about U.S. intentions. It is important to learn the sources of the
propaganda and counter the propaganda with both words and actions.
It is also important to keep a close eye on the neighbors of countries that
are battling insurgencies. Often these countries have their own plans
for their neighbors. Weapons and volunteers have been known to cross
over from bordering countries. That this happens does not n
 ecessarily
mean that it is happening with the consent of that country. If it is not,
then that neighboring country should be pressed to take action against
those helping the insurgency. Additionally, the borders should be
tightly guarded to curtail, and hopefully stop, the flow of weapons and
volunteers from neighboring countries.
When fighting an insurgency it is important to understand their

culture and why the conflict exists in the first place. Without c ollecting
intelligence on these two areas, mistakes, such as the mistakes that the
United States made in Lebanon, could be made. A conflict has to be
understood before it can be diffused and a culture has to be understood
because the culture provides the backdrop for every aspect of their
life. The United States tried to interpret Lebanon in terms of American
culture. This misinterpretation caused many of the problems that drove
the Muslim factions in Lebanon against the United States.
Some of these tactics are being used today to combat insurgents in
Iraq and Afghanistan but each one of these tactics is like a piece of a
puzzle. By not using every piece, the puzzle cannot be completed and
the counterinsurgency cannot progress. A counterinsurgency is a long,
difficult process. An insurgency cannot be defeated through brute force.
It requires the precision that only good intelligence can deliver.
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